



Strategies for Year 15
by William S. Hettinger
Low Income Housing Tax Credits (LIHTCs) are
the primary source of public funding for affordable
rental housing development in the United States. This
federal program offers private investors a break on fed-
eral income taxes in exchange for investment in afford-
able housing developments. Since 1987, it has helped to
create more than 1.6 million affordable units. To ensure
these new units remain affordable, the tax credits come
with strict guidelines that keep projects affordable for a
15-year compliance period. But what happens at the
end of the compliance period? 
The time limits are just beginning to expire on the
first LIHTC transactions in New England and
throughout United States, and many organizations are
wrestling with the new and growing problem of what
happens next. In most cases, the investors expect to ter-
minate their participation without adverse tax conse-
quences and possibly with capital gains. Typically, the
ownership of the property needs to be restructured. And
sometimes, there is pressure to convert to market rate
housing. Community development organizations are
struggling with tough questions. How can they restruc-
ture the ownership of the property? How can they keep
the units affordable? How can they pay off the investors? 
To better understand how organizations are dealing
with this issue, Wyndham Financial Group conducted
interviews in the spring of 2005 with several nonprofit
and for-profit LIHTC project sponsors, tax credit syn-
dicators, housing finance organizations, and affordable
housing organizations. This article summarizes the
results of those interviews.It discusses the specific issues
faced by project sponsors and describes the strategies
that organizations are using to transfer the ownership of
LIHTC properties. It also presents lessons learned from
those who have gone through the process, and offers a
roadmap for organizations that will be facing these
questions in the near future.
LIHTC Basics
Enacted by Congress as part of the Tax Reform Act
of 1986, LIHTCs finance an estimated 1,300 projects
and 90,000 units each year. Like other tax credit pro-
grams, LIHTCs are an indirect subsidy. Rather than
allocate government dollars directly to affordable hous-
ing developments, they engage the private market, ide-
ally enabling affordable housing dollars to be allocated
more efficiently.
The tax credits are distributed to each state, based
on population. Indexed to inflation, the allocation rate
for 2005 was $1.85 per capita. Massachusetts, with a
population of 6.3 million, received an allocation of
approximately $11 million. The states distribute the
credits to eligible affordable housing developments.The
legislation requires that 10 percent be set aside for non-
profit developers, who tend to keep all units affordable,
unlike for-profit developers, who mix market rate and
affordable units in the same project. In fact, HUD sta-
tistics reveal that more than 30 percent of LIHTC units
have been created by nonprofit community development
organizations.
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Developers that receive the credits then sell them to
investors, who, in exchange for providing cash now, receive a
dollar for dollar reduction in their federal income taxes over
the next ten years. Consider a basic tax credit deal. A devel-
oper receives a tax credit allocation of $1 million from the
state.This is an annual amount,totaling $10 million over ten
years.An investor purchases the credits at a price equal to the
present value of the 15-year stream of tax benefits—the 10-
year reduction plus minor tax benefits stemming from any
operating losses on the property. In this case, the investor
would pay between $6 million and $8 million for the credits,
providing the developer with needed equity for the project.
Often, the process of selling tax credits involves the use
of a tax credit syndicator, who matches developers who have
tax credits with for-profit investors who are seeking to
reduce their taxes. Typically, syndicators pool money from
several investors and use the funds to purchase tax credits
from different affordable housing developers. The syndica-
tor acts as an underwriter for the investor, assuring that proj-
ects meet agreed upon standards and remain in compliance
with tax credit regulations. Most syndicators are for-profit
with a chief aim of providing a return for their investors.
However, there are also a number of socially responsible syn-
dicators who are equally interested in supporting communi-
ty development and affordable housing initiatives.
Once the tax credits are sold, the investors, syndicator,
and developer must agree on the terms of ownership and
operation of the property. Typically, a limited partnership is
formed. The investors become limited partners, owning 99
percent of the property, while a general partner, typically a
special purpose subsidiary of the developer or nonprofit
sponsor, owns the remainder. The general partner has
responsibility for the day-to-day operation of the property
and may be contractually responsible for any operating loss-
es. This ownership structure benefits investors, allowing
them to receive the tax advantages of real estate ownership,
but frees them from having to play an active role in the oper-
ation of the property.
Under the tax code, the partnership must agree to oper-
ate the property as affordable housing for 15 years. Forty
percent of all units must have rents that are no more than 30
percent of household income for households earning less
than 60 percent of the area’s median income. Alternatively,
20 percent of the units must have rents that are affordable to
households earning less than 50 percent of area median
income. Tenant qualification, income verification, financial
reporting, and other operating requirements specified in the
LIHTC regulations must be followed. In 1989, a
Congressional amendment extended the affordability
requirement to 30 years, although the limited partners are
required to maintain their investment only for the first 15
years.1
In its early years, the LIHTC program saw limited use.
The program was complicated to learn,the transactions were
expensive to structure, and other public funding for afford-
able housing was available. As a result, only a small number
of tax credit projects date from before 1990. However, the
program gained favor over time as it became better under-
stood and better funded at a time when other sources of
money were drying up. This timing means that the first
major wave of LIHTC transactions is just now reaching the
end of the 15-year compliance period, and many organiza-
tions are asking themselves, “What do we do at the end of
year 15?”
The detailed interviews conducted by Wyndham
Financial Group in the spring of 2005 focused on just this
question. The 15 respondents included affordable housing
developers, tax credit syndicators, state housing finance
authorities, and representatives from affordable housing
organizations. The properties, most within New England,
ranged from developments in depressed inner city areas to
suburban properties in hot real estate markets. Some prop-
erties had the 15-year affordability restriction, while others
had 30 or more years of affordability restrictions, but their
investors wanted to leave the partnership at year 15. The
interviewees were asked a series of questions regarding the
specific nature of the issues faced at the end of the compli-
ance period, the strategies used to address these issues, and
the lessons they learned through the process. Their respons-
es can help to shed light on this complicated issue and pro-
vide guidance for those whose compliance periods have yet
to expire.
The Issues
As the interviews made clear, three primary issues face
most organizations at the end of the compliance period:
1. the payment of exit taxes resulting from a large
negative capital account,
2. refinancing or restructuring existing debt on the
property, and 
3. funding needed repairs to aging housing units.
The interviews also identified number of secondary
issues related to the specific nature of the contract, the orig-
inal structure of the deal, and the parties involved.
1. Exit Taxes
“We were surprised by the size of the negative capital account.We
had projected it to be $20,000 to $25,000 per unit, but it was
much larger because rents did not grow as expected.”
At the end of 15 years, many affordable housing devel-
opments that were financed using LIHTCs have a negative
capital account, resulting from rents that did not grow as
expected, higher operating expenses than originally forecast,
or high interest rates on primary and secondary debt.
Throughout the life of the partnership, these operating loss-
es provided tax benefits to the limited partners, who could
write off losses against owed taxes. However, upon dissolu-
tion of the partnership, tax law requires that these losses be
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recaptured, creating a tax liability for the limited partners. To
protect themselves against this common occurrence, syndica-
tors and investors typically include a provision in the original
partnership agreement that requires that these tax liabilities be
paid either from the assets of the partnership or by the general
partner. As a result, the general partner or partnership must
pay an “exit tax”to cover these tax liabilities in order to dissolve
the partnership. Depending on the magnitude of a property’s
operating losses, these exit taxes can be considerable.
The interviewed sponsors used a variety of techniques to
address exit taxes. Several properties were in hot housing
markets, and these proved to be the simplest to resolve.
Sponsors were able to sell all or a percentage of the units at
current market rates and use the proceeds to pay the exit
taxes, as well as any outstanding debt. In most instances, the
units were converted to condominiums and sold to individu-
als. Occasionally, the entire property was sold and converted
to market rate rentals.
The conversion to market rate units was not a viable
technique for properties under 30-year affordability restric-
tions or where the economics of the property made its con-
version to market rate unlikely. In addition, some organiza-
tions’ missions precluded converting the units to market rate
housing.In these cases,the nonprofit sponsors tried to nego-
tiate a reduced exit tax with the investors and tax credit syn-
dicators. Investors appeared to be more willing to negotiate
exit taxes when the property clearly did not have the finan-
cial ability to pay the full amount of the taxes or in instances
where the syndication fund was nearing the end of its term.
Moreover, “socially responsible” syndicators and their
investors demonstrated a greater willingness than their for-
profit counterparts to negotiate exit taxes and to restructure
transactions in ways that preserved affordability. Finally,
rather than negotiate, several nonprofits had success in gen-
erating income through the forgiveness or significant modi-
fication of the partnership’s debt. The income reduced the
negative capital account and in turn, the exit taxes owed.
2. Restructuring Debt 
In addition to the investors’ equity, LIHTC projects are
also financed through one or more mortgages. Most projects
have amortizing first mortgages from banks or state housing
finance agencies, and many also have “soft second,” or inter-
est-only, deferred-payment, mortgages from housing finance
agencies or other state and local government entities. At the
end of the compliance period, most of the combined mort-
gage debt remains outstanding and in some cases, may actu-
ally exceed the initial debt. In order to dissolve the limited
partnership and transfer ownership of the property, these
mortgages must be paid, renegotiated, or forgiven.
For those interviewed, the renegotiation of mortgage
debt proved difficult, particularly when public funds had
been used to finance part of the LIHTC property. Many
state and local government agencies, given their own current
budget constraints, were reluctant to forgive debt, particular-
ly on soft second mortgages on which large amounts of
interest had accrued. While public lenders were not neces-
sarily looking to be repaid in cash, they were not willing or
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able to forgive debt on the properties outright, especially
since forgiving a mortgage decreases exit taxes, generating a
capital gain for the private investors. However, in many
cases, they were willing to renegotiate the terms of the debt
in order to facilitate the restructuring of the property and the
preservation of affordable units. These public debt renegoti-
ations typically included the imposition of additional afford-
ability restrictions or the extension of existing restrictions.
Debt forgiveness from private lenders and the nonprof-
it sponsor was a viable alternative for some organizations. In
one situation, the nonprofit sponsor controlled a part of the
subordinated debt on the property and was willing to forgive
this debt, generating enough income to wipe out the nega-
tive capital account and the exit taxes. In another case, the
sponsor was still owed a part of its developer’s fee, had struc-
tured the fee as a loan to the partnership, and was in a posi-
tion to forgive this debt.
3. Repair Funding
As might be expected of 15-year-old residential proper-
ties, all of the projects in the study needed a cash injection
for repairs and rehabilitation at the end of the compliance
period. Some properties needed only modest repairs, while
others required extensive rehabilitation. On average, the
typical unit needed between $6,000 and $7,000 in repairs.
Finding this money was a challenge.
Sponsors had mixed results in obtaining repair and reha-
bilitation funds from state housing finance agencies. In gen-
eral, these agencies had limited funds and were perceived to
have insufficient focus on the preservation of tax credit units,
orienting themselves more toward the production of new
units. Moreover, agencies were reluctant to commit addition-
al public money to a property if a portion of the funds was
going to be used to pay exit taxes to private investors.
“They do not want to refinance it if it puts money in the pocket
of the limited partner or others.”
Thus, these agencies offered a viable funding source only in
limited instances.
On the other hand, nonprofit sponsors had success in
finding funds to repair or rehabilitate units,as well as pay exit
taxes and pay off debt, from tax-exempt bond issuances and
the resyndication of properties with new tax credits. Tax-
In 1987,West Side Federation for Senior and Supportive Housing,
Inc. (WSFSSH) developed Kowal House on the upper west side of
Manhattan.The 72-unit housing development was designed to serve
elderly adults with a history of homelessness,providing them with not
only a permanent shelter, but also needed supportive services. The
project was one of the first in the nation to be financed using low
income housing tax credits. Development costs for the project were
just over $2.9 million.Of this amount,$2 million was obtained through
loans from private banks and the city, while LIHTCs provided the
remaining funds.
Once the project opened, Kowal House befell a fate common to
many low income housing projects:operating revenue did not meet ini-
tial projections.WSFSSH had counted on Section 8 rental subsidies to
cover a sizable portion of tenants’ rent,but federal spending on Section
8 did not rise as expected. Rental income fell short and was not
enough to cover both operating expenses and loan payments.
Choosing to continue operating the complex,WSFSSH allowed the ini-
tial construction loan to go unpaid.
By the end of the LIHTC 15-year compliance period in 2002, the
situation was serious.The lenders were unhappy that the cash flow from
the property was insufficient to make full loan payments and frustrated
that their short term construction loan had now been outstanding for
almost 15 years.They wanted to be repaid. In addition, the 15-year tax
credit compliance period was expiring,and the deal was structured such
that the limited partnership would be closed out after 15 years. WSF-
SSH needed to restructure the ownership of the property and negoti-
ate with the tax syndicator, National Equity Fund (NEF), over the pay-
ment of exit taxes from the project’s substantial losses.To complicate
the matter, the property needed improvements.Wheelchair accessibili-
ty changes,energy conservation measures,and the installation of a com-
mercial kitchen to support a meals program were all required if WSF-
SSH wanted to continue to effectively serve its target residents.
To address these issues, WSFSSH began negotiating with its
lenders and with NEF. “We had to demonstrate why Kowal House was
in trouble and what had to happen to fix it.Then,we had to tie this to
our mission and build an argument for solving the problem,” says Laura
Tavormina, the organization’s housing director.
Despite the financial issues, the parties involved valued the serv-
ices Kowal House was providing to New York’s elderly and shared
WSFSSH’s wish to maintain the mission of the property. “Everyone
could see the vision,” says Tavormina. “The city was committed to
preservation,recognizing that it was cheaper to preserve than to build
another building. NEF shared our social mission.They were all willing
to work with us,and it gave us an opportunity to restructure and work
it out better.”
After almost two years of work,in April 2004,WSFSSH had final-
ly negotiated a restructured transaction. A new $2.5 million loan for
the property was obtained from the city’s department of housing
preservation and development. With a reduced interest rate, the loan
was structured around payments that the property could more realis-
tically afford.The money provided sufficient funds to pay off existing
lenders and to make the needed improvements to the property.
Additionally,WSFSSH was able to negotiate substantially reduced exit
taxes with NEF.
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exempt bonds were a popular source of funds for many of the
interviewed parties, particularly those who were involved in
larger transactions, in the $3 million to $4 million range,
where the bonds could be issued cost effectively. In some
instances, tax-exempt bond financing was combined with
new tax credit allocations, and properties were resyndicated
into a new limited partnership. Some nonprofit sponsors
combined several smaller properties into a larger project to
obtain the critical size necessary for the issuance of tax-
exempt bonds or the resyndication of the properties.
Other Issues
When LIHTC programs began, there was a general
expectation that the partnership would exist for the 15-year
compliance period, and then the limited partners would be
paid off and the transaction restructured. Likewise, it was
also generally understood that the nonprofit sponsor, gener-
al partner, or tenants would be the successor owners of the
property, continuing to operate it as affordable housing.
Unfortunately, in early deals, this understanding was not
spelled out clearly in the partnership documents. As a result,
there was no mechanism to force the dissolution of the part-
nership or the restructuring of the property in year 15. This
ambiguity negatively affected investors who had planned on
exiting in year 15, tax credit syndicators who had operated
funds assuming a 15-year horizon, and nonprofit sponsors
who wanted to restructure the ownership of the property to
fit their affordable housing and community development
mission. New details of dissolution had to be negotiated,
requiring staff, resources, time, and energy. In the worst
cases, an agreement was not reached, and the operation of
the property continued under the existing partnership.
Fortunately, this issue will subside over time, as partnership
documents have become more specific regarding the meth-
ods and options for dissolving the partnership at the end of
the compliance period. Current deals now contain a tenant
or sponsor purchase option or an option for the investor to
“put” the property, requiring the general partner, tenants, or
others to purchase it.2
Another issue identified among the interviewees was the
dissolution of the original sponsoring nonprofit entity. In
several instances, the nonprofit sponsor failed in the 15 years
between the development of the property and the end of the
compliance period. In these cases, another nonprofit had
stepped into the role of sponsor and was responsible for
restructuring the transaction. However,this successor lacked
the historical knowledge of the property and the original
transaction, information that was seen as necessary to effec-
tively restructure the project. Thus, the loss of the original
sponsor created another level of complexity and confusion.
Finally, restructuring the ownership of the properties at
the end of the compliance period was found to be a compli-
cated and time consuming process. Dissolving the partner-
ship and converting the property to new ownership took
almost as much time as the original LIHTC transaction.
Most of the interviewed organizations began working on the
transition 18 to 24 months before the expiration of the com-
pliance period. Many noted that they should have started
sooner, finding that 18 months did not give them enough
time to complete the transaction.The transition also required
a significant commitment of the organization’s resources and
strained capacity, staff, and budgets. Most organizations
relied heavily on the executive director to manage the process,
leaving development staff to focus on new work and the
finance team to maintain the organization’s operations. Many
organizations hired the expertise of outside consultants, in
addition to the partnership’s accountants and attorneys.
Keys to Success
While the interviews revealed that each LIHTC trans-
action is unique—in its markets, financial structures, and
partnership documents—collectively, their experiences
uncovered a number of common steps that any organization
can take to improve the success of restructuring an LIHTC
property at the end of the 15-year compliance period:
1.Start early.
Restructuring an LIHTC deal takes time and planning.
It is not a task that can be left to the last minute. Sponsors
with tax credit projects created 10 to 12 years ago should
begin to plan for the restructuring now. Sponsors with proj-
ects that are only a few years old should monitor the capital
account and seek ways to minimize exit taxes in the future.
2. Acquire or hire expertise.
Restructuring an LIHTC transaction is a complicated
task that requires expertise, staff resources, and money, and
organizations should start to build capacity on all fronts.One
way to build internal expertise is to attend a tax credit part-
nership transition seminar sponsored by the National Equity
Fund, LISC, or another affordable housing development
umbrella organization. By networking with local housing
consultants, attorneys, and accountants, organizations can
identify outside expertise that can assist them as they move
through the process. Importantly, if an organization is con-
templating using external resources, potential sources of
funding for these resources should be considered.
3. Understand the deal.
One of the most important steps an organization can
take before restructuring an LIHTC transaction is to devel-
op a solid understanding of the original deal. This transac-
tion was completed more than a dozen years ago, and by this
time, the original staff may have left, or if still there, may
have forgotten the details of the transaction. Refreshing this
knowledge involves rereading the legal and loan documents,
as well as understanding how the financial conditions of the
project and value of the property may have changed.
Legal documents. Dig out the transaction’s legal docu-
ments and review them to determine what rights andSummer 2005 18
requirements exist at the end of the compliance period. Are
there extended use requirements?  Do the investors have the
right to “put” the property to the sponsor or general partner?
Do the tenants have a purchase option?  Does the sponsor or
general partner have a purchase option?  How are exit taxes
calculated?  Are the investors entitled to a return of their
capital? Can the partnership be continued indefinitely if a
restructuring is not worked out?  
Loan documents. Review the loan documents. Are the
loans fully amortizing, or is there a balloon payment due in
year 15?  In the event the property is transferred from the part-
nership, are the loans due and payable? Or, can they be trans-
ferred to the succeeding entity? 
Financial condition. Develop a complete financial picture
of the property at the end of the compliance period. Compute
the current capital account and its projected value through
year 15. If it is projected to be negative in year 15,identify any
operational changes that can be implemented now to increase
income and decrease the size of the negative capital account.
Project loan balances for the end of year 15 and the amounts
expected to be in the operating and replacement reserves.
Property value. Determine the current market value of
the property. If the affordability restrictions expire at the end
of the compliance period, compute the value of the property
both with and without the restrictions. If the restrictions
continue, the computation should reflect them. If the prop-
erty is in a neighborhood where values differ substantially
from the surrounding area, make sure the computed value
differentiates the property. Knowing the property’s value
and how it compares with the overall market gives an organ-
ization an advantage when negotiating with the limited part-
ners, who generally are familiar only with the larger market.
4.Understand the investors’requirements.
Talk to the tax credit syndicator or the limited partners to
determine what their expectations are for the end of the com-
pliance period. Are they interested in a specific internal rate of
return?  Are they expecting a return of capital?  Are exit taxes
their primary concern?  Are they willing and able to negotiate
exit taxes?  Do they perceive the property’s value to be substan-
tially different from the organization’s projections?  
5. Understand the lender’s requirements.
Talk to each of the lenders. Determine their require-
ments and expectations regarding the repayment of loans.
Are the first mortgage lenders willing to be flexible regarding
the assumption of the debt by a successor owner, or are they
going to enforce the due-on-sale provisions?  Are the subor-
dinate lenders expecting to be repaid in full at the end of the
compliance period? Are they willing and able to forgive some
or all of the debt? Or, are they willing to negotiate the terms
of the debt to preserve the affordable housing units?
6. Create a plan.
To effectively restructure the ownership of an LIHTC
property at the end of the compliance period, the nonprofit
sponsor must first understand its goals for the property and
then determine a plan to meet those goals. The goal setting
should occur at the highest level of the organization, includ-
ing the executive director and the board, and to the extent
possible, should reflect the tenants’ goals for the property.
Once goals are established, an action plan should be created,
accounting for all of the tasks and steps that must be pursued
Andover, Massachusetts, an affluent suburban community north of
Boston, has seen tremendous growth in housing values in the last several
decades.Today,houses selling for a half-million dollars are the norm,and the
rising prices are increasingly causing concern among housing advocates and
local government officials.As such, the town of Andover is committed to
ensuring a stock of affordable housing, and currently 11.6 percent of all
housing units in the town are affordable.
However,the community is faced with losing many of its 1,331 afford-
able units as affordability restrictions expire. Of particular concern are two
developments, Andover Commons and Riverview Commons,which,by the
end of 2006, may lose a total of 222 affordable units. Given the hot hous-
ing market, community leaders are concerned that most of the units will
be converted to condos or other market rate projects.
The properties are owned by private developers,and the community
has no control over the preservation of the affordable units. “There are no
hooks in the documents to keep them affordable,” says Susan Stott of the
Andover Housing Partnership.“We may lose affordable housing units, and
there is nothing we can do.” 
However, the community is working to do what it can. Recently,
another development,Brookside Apartments,reached the end of its afford-
ability restrictions and was set to restructure as market rate housing.Mass
Housing Partnership became involved in the restructuring and helped to
mitigate the loss to only 14 units. The remaining 28 were preserved as
affordable units. Mass Housing also helped to structure the transaction so
that tenants were not displaced when the 14 units were converted to con-
dos and sold. Without the involvement of this public agency as the lender,
all of the affordable units might have been lost.
Unfortunately,Andover may not be so lucky with its other expiring
properties. In one case,the affordability restrictions on the property were
already extended for five more years during a 2001 restructuring, and it is
questionable whether they will be extended again.In the other case,afford-
able units are already being transformed into market rate condos as the
affordability restrictions expire in phases through the end of 2006. The
community worries that with the loss of these properties, the town’s
affordable housing stock will drop below 10 percent,the number at which
developers can override local zoning ordinances under the state’s afford-
able housing laws. They are also concerned about displacing long time
Andover residents who are struggling to keep up in the increasingly
wealthy community.As more and more properties reach their expiration
dates, the community must grapple with how it will replenish its supply.
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to make the transition a success. The plan should be contin-
ually monitored and adjusted with mid-course corrections
throughout the process.
7. Negotiate from strength.
In following the first six steps—starting early, acquiring
expertise, understanding the deal, understanding the
investor’s requirements, understanding the lender’s require-
ments, and developing a workable implementation plan—an
organization has made itself an expert in the transaction.This
expertise should be used to the organization’s advantage
throughout the negotiation process,making certain for exam-
ple, that all parties fully understand the value and condition
of the property.
8. Be proactive.
The sponsoring organization should take the lead in
restructuring the transaction rather than waiting for the limited
partners or lenders to act. By being proactive, the sponsor will
be able to control the pace of the restructuring and will be bet-
ter able to direct the focus of the other parties on the issues and
on finding their solutions.
These steps suggest a roadmap for for-profit and nonprofit
community development organizations to follow as they wres-
tle with the issues associated with the end of the LIHTC com-
pliance period. Above all, as organizations struggle to restruc-
ture property ownership and preserve affordable housing, they
should remember that a willingness to be creative and explore
“outside the box” alternatives is essential to success.
1 Additionally, any time after the end of year 14, owners may seek a “quali-
fied contract” offer from the state agency that originally allocated the tax
credits to buy the property. If the agency fails to offer such a contract, which
calculates the property price based on a standard formula, the additional 15-
year restriction is dissolved.
2 A 1990 Congressional amendment gives nonprofit general partners, tenant
organizations, and government agencies the right of first refusal to buy the
property at a price equal to the value of the total outstanding secured debt
and all taxes generated by the sale, even if this amount is less than fair mar-
ket value.
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